In Transco v Stockport, who can sue and be sued under Rylands as a sub-section of private nuisance?

In the context of the case Transco v Stockport, the correct choice points to the principle that the standing to sue and be sued under the Rylands v Fletcher doctrine mirrors the standing in private nuisance cases. This means that individuals or entities who can assert a claim under Rylands must be those who have an interest in land affected by the nuisance.

This alignment with private nuisance principles is significant because it upholds the notion that both doctrines are protective measures for landowners and parties with lawful interests in the land. Therefore, individuals who directly suffer damage to their property as a result of the dangerous activity or use of land by another can initiate action. Importantly, this principle emphasizes the relationship between the party bringing the action and the land involved, which is foundational in both private nuisance and the Rylands v Fletcher doctrine.

In contrast, choices suggesting a narrower interpretation, such as limiting the right to sue to only local authorities, or implying broader groups like "any person in the area," do not accurately capture the established legal framework governing these actions. Those factors reinforce the understanding that the capacity to initiate suits in nuisance contexts is primarily granted to those with a legitimate interest directly affected by the nuisance, aligning with the rights conferred under private nuisance principles.